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FEDNAV, LTD. V. CHESTER: BALLAST WATER
AND THE BATTLE TO BALANCE STATE AND
FEDERAL REGULATORY INTERESTS
Jason G. Howe*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a constitutional challenge to the
Michigan Ballast Water Statute (MBWS).2 By unanimously affirming
the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan,3 the Fednav Court not only declined to invalidate state laws
protecting Michigan’s waters from aquatic nuisance species (ANS),4 but
also rejected claims that the MBWS should be preempted by broad
federal regulation.5
Through its Fednav decision, the Sixth Circuit iterated that Michigan
may still play a vital role in protecting its ecological and economic
interests. ANS pose a serious threat to the ecological well-being of
Michigan’s waters and the state’s economic health.6 Accordingly, ANS
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank
both Professor David Owen, whose insight and guidance proved invaluable, and my wife,
Amanda, for her patience and support. Any errors herein are entirely my own.
1. 547 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2008).
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112 (LexisNexis 2009).
3. Fednav, Ltd., v. Chester, 505 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D. Mich. 2007), aff’d, 547 F.3d
607 (6th Cir. 2008).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 4702(1) (1994) (defining ANS as “nonindigenous species that
threaten[] the diversity or abundance of native species or the ecological stability of
infested waters.”). See Jason A. Boothe, Comment, Defending the Homeland: A Call to
Action in the War Against Aquatic Invasive Species, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 407, n.1 (2008).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”) (emphasis added).
6. See Fednav, 547 F.3d at 610; Boothe, supra note 4, at 410-11; Loren Remsberg,
Too Many Cooks in the Galley: Overlapping Agency Jurisdiction of Ballast Water
Regulation, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1412, 1414-15 (2008). Introduction of ANS results
“in severe and irreversible impacts on environmental quality and biological diversity, on
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control measures must be comprehensive, particularly in the Great Lakes
region, since incomplete measures are unlikely to provide adequate
protection.7 While federal laws clearly preempt those of a state when
conflicts arise,8 states may nonetheless contribute to achieving the
common goal of protecting the state’s environmental and economic
interests. Furthermore, states are obligated by a duty to their citizens’
health and economic security to enact state-centric legislation when
Congress leaves loopholes9 in its regulatory scheme. As such, the
pertinent legal question addressed in this Note is whether Fednav struck
an appropriate balance between federal and state regulatory interests in
allowing the MBWS to stand.
This Note initially considers the federal attempts to regulate ANS in
the Great Lakes along with the evolution of overlapping federal and state
regulatory schemes for managing ANS. After analyzing the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning in Fednav, this Note briefly explains that the Fednav
Court appropriately recognized Congress’ intent to balance the
supremacy of federal law with Michigan’s duty to implement legislation
that protects its ecological and economic interests. Finally, this Note
considers Fednav in the broader context of federal-state cooperation on
issues such as ballast water regulation and ANS. It posits that the key
issue is how to best manage overlapping state and federal control, then
proposes a solution for implementing coterminous federal and state
regulations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Environmental Regulation in a Nutshell
A brief history of state and federal environmental regulations is
necessary to put current ANS regulations into context.10 Modern
economic and recreational activities, and on public health.” Id. at 1414 (citations
omitted). Damage estimates for the Great Lakes region alone exceeded $5 billion in
1995. Id. at 1414-15.
7. See Boothe, supra note 4, at 414-26.
8. Ohio Mfrs. Ass’n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 825-28 (6th Cir. 1986).
9. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612.
10. Detailing the rich and invariably complex history of environmental regulation is
well beyond the scope of this Note. For more detailed treatment of the subject, consider
the following: Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (Uni. Chicago
Press 2004); Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004) (tracing the history of
trans-boundary environmental disputes in the United States during the late 19th and early
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environmental laws began as something else entirely—nuisance claims.11
These claims more or less dealt with local issues such as factory smoke
However, as
or dust, on a city-by-city, state-by-state basis.12
industrialization proliferated during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, so did problems with various environmental hazards,
ultimately resulting in a push to centralize federal control of such
ecological hazards.13 Inter-state industrial and commercial competition
drove this change, as state-centric regulation could no longer manage
increasing environmental hazards produced on a regional and national
scale.14 By the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress had enacted
broad laws intended to protect the nation’s ecology, along with the social
and economic health tied thereto.15 Sweeping federal mandates such as
the Clean Water Act of 1970 and the Clean Air Act of 1972 frequently
displaced state-centric environmental regulations.16

20th Centuries); Neil Gunningham, Environment Law, Regulation and Governance:
Shifting Architectures, 21 J. ENV. L. 179 (2009) (examining the evolution of
environmental law, regulation and governance from the early 1970s into the present);
Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism: The
Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 231 (2009) (arguing that states have progressively taken a greater
role in environmental regulation over the past several decades).
11. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,
600 & n.90 (1996). See also Aldred's Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.) (reasoning
that one should use his property in such a manner as not to injure that of another.); Tenant
v. Goldwin, (1702) 92 Eng. Rep. 222, 224 (Q.B.) (expressing the maxim that “every man
must so use his own as not to damnify another.”).
12. Esty, supra note 11, at 600 n.90. See also Robert V. Percival, Environmental
Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141,1156
(1995) (suggesting that even federal environmental programs of the 1950s and 1960s
were “premised on the notion” that environmental problems fell within the purview of
state and local governments).
13. Esty, supra note 11, at 600 & n.93.
14. Id. at 601-2 (arguing Congress enacted broad federal laws because patchwork
state laws led to interstate businesses shopping state-by-state for more lenient standards).
15. Id. at 602. Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970, the Clean Water Act in
1972, the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974, and the 1976 Resource Conservation Act,
among others. Id.
16. Id. at 602. See also Percival, supra note 12, at 1155.
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B. Federal and State Attempts to Regulate Aquatic Nuisance Species
In 1990, Congress recognized the zebra mussel17 as one of several
new environmental hazards in the Great Lakes region, passing the
Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act
(NANPCA) in response.18 NANPCA recognized that ballast water19
discharges caused the ANS hazard, and sought to control ballast water
management systems20 by charging the United States Coast Guard
(USCG) with developing and implementing such regulations.21 In 1993,
the USCG issued regulations requiring ballast-carrying vessels entering
the Great Lakes from beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)22 to
meet one of three ballast water management practices: (1) exchange
ballast water beyond the EEZ; (2) retain ballast water; or (3) use an
environmentally sound alternative.23 Ships were also encouraged to keep
records of each ballast water exchange.24 While compliance was
originally voluntary, it became mandatory two years later.25
By 1996, Congress recognized that ANS posed a threat not only to
the Great Lakes, but to the entire country and amended NANPCA with
the National Invasive Species Act (NISA).26 NISA retained the ballast
water regulations of NANPCA, and required that ballast-carrying vessels
entering inland U.S. waters file a ballast water management plan with the
USCG twenty-four hours prior to entering port.27 Furthermore, NISA
17. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 610. The zebra mussel, a bi-valve mollusk native to the
Black and Caspian Seas, quickly coated water pipes, boat hulls, and consumed large
quantities of microscopic organisms that local species relied on to survive. Id.
18. See 16 U.S.C. § 4701 et seq. (2006).
19. Sea-going vessels often use water as ballast to add stability while at sea. Fednav,
505 F. Supp. 2d at 384. Once in port, a vessel may discharge tens-of-millions of tons of
water. Remsberg, supra note 6, at 1413-14.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 4701(b)(1) (2006).
21. Id. at § 4711(b)(1) (2006).
22. 33 C.F.R. § 151.1504 (2008) (defining the EEZ as “the area . . . which extends
from the base line of the territorial sea of the United States seaward 200 [nautical]
miles.”).
23. Id. at § 151.1510(a) (2008).
24. Boothe, supra note 4, at 415-16.
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4711(a)-(b). Failure to comply is punishable by a fine of up to
$27,500 and a “felony conviction for knowing violations.” See also Boothe, supra note
4, at 415-16.
26. Boothe, supra note 4, at 416-18. See also Fednav, 547 F.3d at 611-12 (detailing
control measures under NISA); 16 U.S.C. 4701(a)(13) (explaining that national action is
required immediately).
27. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612. See also 33 C.F.R. § 151.2041(b) (2008); Remsberg,
supra note 6, at 1418-19.
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specifically recognized that “participation and cooperation of the Federal
Government and state governments” would eventually be necessary.28
Atop NISA, Congress amended the Clean Water Act (CWA) to require
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate “vessels and
other floating craft,” along with the discharge of “biological materials”
such as ANS.29 However, the EPA refused to regulate ballast water
discharges until it was ordered to do so in 2006 by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.30 The California
court gave the EPA until September 30, 2008 to enact ballast water
regulations that would coexist with NISA.31 The ramifications of this
decision for Fednav are discussed in greater detail below.32
However, the CWA, NANPCA, and NISA have each failed to fully
regulate vessels with the potential to spread ANS via ballast water,
leaving open an “enormous loophole”33 in the federal regulatory scheme.
No federal ballast water regulation controlled vessels designated as “No
Ballast On Board” (NOBOB).34 Vessels designated NOBOB have
ballast tanks and can still carry ballast water.35 However, NOBOBs are
usually already loaded with cargo, and therefore neither need, nor carry
ballast when they enter the Great Lakes region.36 Although considered
empty, a NOBOB vessel’s ballast tanks retain residual sediment and
water that may house ANS.37 Once in port and unloaded, NOBOB
vessels are free to take in water or adjust ballast levels as operators see
28. 16 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(15) (2006).
29. Remsberg, supra note 6, at 1415 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)).
30. Remsberg, supra note 6, at 1418-19.
31. As of the publication of this Note, the EPA has enacted no such plan. Remsberg,
supra note 6, at 1418-19. As a point of context, in 2005, Judge Illston of the Northern
District of California found that the EPA's failure to regulate ballast water as a pollutant
under the Clean Water Act was contrary to the clear intent of that statute, despite the fact
that the EPA had exempted ballast water from regulation since 1973. Nw. Envtl.
Advocates v. EPA, 2005 WL 756614, at *8-9 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 30, 2005), aff’d, 537 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2008). She granted the EPA two years to promulgate regulations regarding
the discharge of ballast water pursuant to the Clean Water Act. Nw. Envtl. Advocates v.
EPA, 2006 WL 2669042, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 18, 2006). The EPA has begun the
process of soliciting comments for rulemaking, but has not yet enacted final rules. See
Development of Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permits for Discharges Incidental to the Normal Operation of Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg.
34241, 34241 (June 21, 2007).
32. See infra, Section III.
33. Fednav, 547 F.3d 612; Boothe, supra note 4, at 419.
34. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612; 33 C.F.R. § 151.1502 (2008).
35. Boothe, supra note 4, at 419 nn.92-93.
36. Id.
37. Id.; Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612.

386

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

fit, potentially introducing ANS in the very manner NISA sought to
avoid.38 This is significant because eighty-five percent of all vessels
entering the Great Lakes are designated NOBOB.39 In essence, these
NOBOB vessels are “unregulated with respect to their ballast-water
practices.”40
C. Michigan’s Implementation of the Michigan Ballast Water Statute
Recognizing this deficiency in the existing federal regulations,
Michigan amended its Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Act to include the MBWS,41 under which all vessels “engaging in port
operations in Michigan” as of January 1, 2007 had to obtain a state
permit.42 The permit required a vessel’s operator to fill out a multi-page
application43 and agree to follow state ANS regulations.44 Compliance
required filing a report with the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality (MDEQ) prior to entering a Michigan port.45 A vessel not
planning to exchange ballast water in Michigan had to certify such a
decision with the MDEQ.46 Alternatively, vessels that planned to
exchange ballast water had to employ one of four state ballast water
treatment methods.47 Fednav arose in response to the MBWS, placing
the security of both Michigan’s MBWS, and the security of the local
health and economy in jeopardy.

38. Boothe, supra note 4, at 419 n.93; Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612.
39. Boothe, supra note 4, at 419.
40. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 612.
41. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112 (LexisNexis 2009).
42. Id. § 324.3112(6).
43. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 613 (“[t]o obtain a General Permit, a vessel operator is
required to fill out a three-page application and pay a $75 application fee and a $150
annual fee.”).
44. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112(6) (LexisNexis 2009).
45. Id. (indicating that reports must include vessel name, port destination, date and
type of last ballast-water management practice, total volume or weight of ballast on
board, and a statement regarding whether the vessel intends to exchange any ballast water
while in a Michigan port).
46. Id.
47. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 613. Treatment options under the MBWS include (1)
hypochlorite treatment, (2) chlorine dioxide treatment, (3) ultraviolet light radiation
treatment, or (4) deoxygenation treatment. Id.
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III. THE FEDNAV, LTD. V. CHESTER DECISION
In Fednav, a consortium of shipping companies and their
associations, and port companies and their trade associations,48 sued
MDEQ Director Steven Chester and other officials,49 seeking an
injunction preventing enforcement of the MBWS on grounds that it
violated the Michigan Constitution, the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses of the United States Constitution, and should be preempted by
broad federal regulations.50 The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
shortly thereafter, while the defendants filed a corresponding motion to
dismiss.51
Assessing the case procedurally, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan should have considered whether the
plaintiffs had standing to bring their case. However, the court never
addressed standing. 52 Instead, the court first addressed the jurisdictional
issues raised under the Eleventh Amendment,53 finding the plaintiffs
lacked authorization to bring state-law claims against a Michigan official
in federal court without state consent.54 The court then applied the
“rational basis” test to the defendants’ due process claim,55 finding “[i]t
was clearly rational for Michigan to enact [the MBWS],”56 then quickly
dismissed the Commerce Clause claim for lack of “discriminatory affect”

48. Plaintiff-Appellants: Fednav, Ltd.; Canadian Forest Navigation Co., Ltd; Baffin
Investments, Ltd.; Confornav, Ltd.; Shipping Federation of Canada; Seaway Great Lakes
Trade Association; United States Great Lakes Shipping Association; Nicholson Terminal
and Dock Co.; and, the American Great Lakes Ports Association. They are collectively
referred to hereinafter as Plaintiffs. See Fednav, 547 F.3d at 607.
49. Michigan Attorney General Michael Cox is also a Defendant-Respondent. Several
environmental groups also intervened, including Michigan United Conservation Clubs,
Alliance for the Great Lakes, National Wildlife Federation and Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.2. They are collectively referred to
hereinafter as Defendants.
50. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 388-89.
51. Id. at 389-90.
52. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment encompasses claims against a state by citizens of that state).
54. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124-25 (1984) (indicating that the Supreme Court has “insisted .
. . that the State's consent be unequivocally expressed.”)).
55. Id. at 391-92; see 37712, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. Liquor Control, 113 F.3d 614, 619-20
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding substantive due process is only violated if a law fails to advance
a legitimate interest).
56. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
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because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim of undue burden.57 In
addressing plaintiffs’ primary claim that federal law must preempt the
MBWS under United States v. Locke,58 the court tested for field
preemption and conflict preemption.59 The trial court distinguished
Locke from Fednav, holding that neither field preemption nor conflict
preemption could apply when: (1) “NISA indisputably contemplates a
role for states” to play,60 (2) there is no clear “interest in uniformity” at
issue under NISA,61 unlike the state code at issue in Locke,62 and (3) the
NISA savings clause exempts laws like the MBWS from preemption.63
After oral arguments on all motions, the court dismissed each of
plaintiffs’ claims.64 In dicta, the court indicated that if plaintiffs “want to
make the policy argument that federal law should preempt all state
regulation of ballast water management, they are free to do so before
Congress.”65
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first considered whether each plaintiff
had standing to challenge the MBWS requirements that all vessels
capable of carrying ballast water first obtain a permit and then employ a
treatment system approved by the MDEQ.66 The court ultimately found
that the shipping companies had standing to challenge the permit
requirement because compliance required them to purchase a permit,67

57. Id. at 397-98.
58. 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding federal law preempted Washington state laws
regulating aspects of the oil tanker industry because the state laws frustrated Congress’
intent to create a uniform regulatory scheme to control oil tanker design).
59. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 392-97. Furthermore, “field preemption” occurs when
“the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation,” while “conflict
preemption” occurs when a provision of state law “actually conflicts with federal law.”
Akron, 801 F.2d at 828 (internal quotations omitted).
60. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96.
61. Id. at 395-96 (identifying this issue as key to both field preemption and conflict
preemption considerations). Unlike the flexible treatment regulations at issue in Fednav,
in Locke, it was impossible to comply with incongruous vessel design regulations. Id. at
396-97.
62. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 97 (identifying WASH. REV. CODE § 88.46.040(3) (1994) as
the issue).
63. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
64. Id. at 390-91.
65. Id. at 396.
66. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 614.
67. Id. at 615.
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hence injury-in-fact.68 As a result, the court also conferred standing to
the shipping associations, since their members had standing independent
of the association.69 However, the court refused to confer standing to
either the dock company or its association, as both failed to allege
suffering injury-in-fact as a result of the permit requirement.70
Additionally, the court found no plaintiff had standing to challenge the
treatment requirement, because rather than allege that compliance would
cost large sums of money, each plaintiff disavowed ever discharging
ANS in their ballast water.71 As the court noted, rather than allege that
the fee structure in place was too costly to shipping companies moving
goods into Michigan ports, the plaintiffs argued only that their vessels
did not release any ballast water.72 Had the plaintiffs argued that such
treatment systems cost upwards of half-a-million dollars per vessel—as
is the case—the court likely would have addressed the issue.73 However,
as the Sixth Circuit noted, the plaintiffs’ “complaint is bereft of any
allegation that any of the Plaintiffs has spent a single dollar, or otherwise
been harmed, because of the treatment requirement.”74 As a result, the
Sixth Circuit only addressed the treatment requirement.75 The plaintiffs’
failure to allege injury-in-fact under the MBWS treatment prong means
that Michigan’s stricter ballast water treatment requirements, and others
like it, remain open to challenge in the future.76
While the Sixth Circuit agreed with the trial court that NISA
specifically contemplated state and federal cooperation, the court found
NISA’s savings clause related to ANS “control measures,” not
“prevention.”77 Nonetheless, the court applied the intent test from Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.78 in finding that Congress intended to allow states
to employ preventative ANS measures in addition to “control
measures.”79 In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to NISA and
reasoned that Congress not only recognized the potential for a symbiotic
68. A “party bringing suit ‘must show that the action injures him in a concrete and
personal way.’” Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
69. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 615.
70. Id. at 616.
71. Id. at 616-17.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 616 (emphasis in original).
75. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 618.
76. Boothe, supra note 4, at 423.
77. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 619-20.
78. 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (stating that courts must “ascertain Congress’ intent.”).
79. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 620-21.
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relationship between state and federal regulation,80 but encouraged it,81
finding neither field preemption nor conflict preemption.82 Furthermore,
the court found plaintiffs’ argument that shipping was inherently federal
under Locke—and therefore beyond state control—to be misguided.83
Instead, the court reasoned that Locke only required a court to consider
the scope of a state’s regulation in relation to its federal counterpart, not
the relative federal nature of the activity being regulated.84 Since it was
“physically possible” to comply with both NISA and MBWA standards,
and because additional reporting requirements under the MBWS do not
infringe on NISA’s intent, the Sixth Circuit found no conflict
whatsoever.85
Having found that NISA contemplated state regulations like the
MBWA, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause and due process claims. Unlike the trial
court, which applied the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.86 balancing test in
finding the relative benefits of ANS regulation far outweighed the burden
of completing “a few forms,”87 the Sixth Circuit found no balancing was
necessary.88 The court reasoned that the Commerce Clause cannot act in
dormancy when a federal regulation such as NISA specifically
contemplates the enactment of state regulations like MBWS.89
Emphatically, the court indicated that by “enacting NISA . . . Congress
expressly contemplated, and indeed encouraged, state participation in
ANS prevention measures. We would lose our constitutional bearings if
we were to hold that the Commerce Clause, in its dormancy, strikes
80. Id. at 620 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4723 (recognizing the need for coordination with the
states)).
81. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 620. See 16 U.S.C. § 1401(15) (calling for the “participation
and cooperation” of federal and state governments).
82. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 622-23. See supra note 59.
83. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 622.
84. Id. See also Locke, 529 U.S. at 108
85. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 623.
86. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (establishing the balancing test between commercial
burden and putative state benefits).
87. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 624 (finding the permit requirement, an application fee of
$75, and a “yearly fee” of $150 “de minimis”). See also Ferndale Labs, Inc., v.
Cavendish, 79 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that an Ohio statute requiring all
prescription drug wholesalers to fill out a two-page registration and pay a $100 fee did
not violate the Commerce Clause, because, inter alia, “[w]e do not consider the $100 fee
a burden.”).
88. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 624 (reasoning that “[i]ndeed, there is no need to conduct the
Pike balancing at all.”)
89. Id.
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down state regulation that Congress, in actively exercising its power
under the Clause, expressly contemplated.”90
Next, using reasoning parallel to that of the trial court, the Sixth
Circuit found a rational basis91 for the MBWS, affirming the dismissal of
plaintiff’s due process claim in just four paragraphs.92 Simply stated,
“Michigan has a legitimate state interest in protecting its waters from
further introductions of ANS from ballast-water discharges by
oceangoing vessels.”93 Finally, in summing up its ruling, the court
indicated it had “no basis to disrupt the . . . democratic process[].”94 The
court’s final words are telling.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Fednav Correctly Seeks to Balance Federal and State Regulations
The Fednav decision correctly indicates that federal courts will not
find state environmental regulation unconstitutional when Congress
provides avenues for state and federal regulatory cooperation. Although
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of constitutional
challenges to the MBWS without reaching the key issue of ballast water
treatment, it nonetheless specifically recognized that Congress
contemplated a regulatory future in which states may provide gap-fillers
when federal regulations fail to sufficiently protect state interests.95 In
effect, Fednav recognizes that federal and state authorities must
cooperate.
Fednav does not mark the first time courts have recognized that
Congress intends states to have a broader, and perhaps more influential
role in meeting federal regulatory ends. For instance, in Massachusetts
90. Id. at 624 (emphasis in original).
91. See 37712, Inc., v. Ohio Dept. Liquor Control, 113 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding substantive due process is only violated if a law fails to advance a legitimate
interest); Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a state law
permit requirement “need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose”
to be upheld); Doe v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503-04 (6th Cir.
2007) (indicating that “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis” will suffice).
92. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 624-25.
93. Id. at 625.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 621 (“NISA’s test thus reveals that Congress expressly contemplated ANS
prevention measures . . . that are conducted by the states.”); Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at
396 (“This indicates that a role for the states was forefront in the minds of the drafters of
NISA.”).
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v. EPA, the Supreme Court not only found that the EPA should control
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act; it also granted
Massachusetts the standing necessary to bring its case,96 thus affording
Massachusetts a chance to dramatically influence federal policy.
Similarly, the Supreme Court affirmed Georgia’s right to protect its
citizens from environmental and chemical hazards originating outside the
state. As stated by Justice Holmes in Georgia v. Tennesee Copper Co.,
each state “has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped
of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”97 The Supreme
Court granted Georgia’s injunction, and upheld the state’s right to
employ legal avenues when protecting its citizens. Both cases stand as
broad recognitions of a state’s right to protect their local environmental
and economic interests when federal regulations fail to do so sufficiently.
Without standing, neither of the states in either Mass. v. EPA, or Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co. could have been heard, let alone defended their
citizens from outside environmental threats. In the broadest sense, all
three—Mass. v. EPA; Georgia v. Tennesee Copper Co.; and, Fednav—
represent an understanding that states may play a vital role in protecting
their local ecology and economy.
B. Fednav and an Evolving Clean Water Act under Northwest
Environmental Advocates v. U.S.
The CWA provides another glimpse of congressional intent to allow
states more control over local environmental measures, since “states can
restrict water pollutants more stringently than the federal government
pursuant the [CWA].”98 While the EPA had—until recently—refused to
regulate ballast water under the CWA, the Ninth Circuit in Northwest
Environmental Advocates v. U.S.99 affirmed a decision by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California to invalidate
40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a).100 Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a), the EPA stated its
position that the CWA did not require it to regulate the release of ballast
96. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532.
97. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (holding Georgia had a right to protect its citizens from
air pollution that originated outside its borders by granting state’s injunction and
affirming state’s standing to bring suit).
98. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
99. 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
100. The invalidated section provided not only that vessel owners need not obtain a
permit for “discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel, including the
discharge of ballast water,” but that the EPA could not set such regulations. Id. at 1010
(emphasis added).
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water.101 Northwest Environmental Advocates not only required the EPA
to rework the invalidated regulation in a manner that recognizes the EPA
is required to regulate ballast water under the CWA, but also in a manner
that comports with Congress’ intended cooperation between both federal
agencies and state powers.102 While Northwest Environmental Advocates
does not directly entail federal preemption of state laws, the broad
regulatory implications for managing ballast water will nonetheless
impact preemption in the future, as an overbroad regulation under the
CWA would undoubtedly displace many state-centric regulations similar
to the MBWS. Yet, as the Ninth Circuit indicated in Northwest
Environmental Advocates, the savings clauses of NANPCA, NISA, EPA
guidelines on cooperation, along with the CWA, all broadly
“demonstrate a congressional intent to address the serious national
problem of ballast water discharges of invasive species, and to do so on
multiple, nonexclusive fronts.”103 Because the proposed replacement
regulation has not yet been finalized, it remains unclear when the issue of
conflict preemption will again become ripe.104 Nonetheless, the proposed
permitting regulations are substantially similar to those already imposed
by Michigan, and as is discussed in Section V of this Note, the EPA must
act under the cooperation requirements of a council formed under
President Clinton,105 and by its own internal mandates.106 For the time

101. Id. at 1027.
102. Id. at 1025 (mandating that the EPA include the Coast Guard, along with state and
local agencies in any action).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Proposed changes to the invalidated code section include a clear intent to regulate
ballast water in the Great Lakes. However, the manner of that regulation, and whether the
EPA plans to defer to the MBWS remains unclear. The proposed regulation provides
little detail. See 73 Fed. Reg. 34296 (June 17, 2008).
105. See infra, Section IV.
106. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures,
58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2159 (2009) (arguing that “congressional acts mandate enforcement
by state regulatory agencies, establishing an institutional framework for agency-state
cooperation.”). See also Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999)
(mandating that to “the extent practicable, State and local officials shall be consulted
before any such action is implemented.”); EPA's Action Development Process, Guidance
on
Exec.
Order
No.
13132:
Federalism
(2008),
available
at
http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/111908rb1.pdf at 21 (emphasizing the importance of
agency consultation with state and local government officials given that “[state and local]
governments carry out most of the day-to-day administration of many national
environmental programs.”).
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being, it is clear that states continue to play a substantial role in
determining their regulatory future.107
C. Employing Fednav’s Guidance to Better Manage Overlapping
Federal and State Regulatory Schemes
Fednav correctly recognizes that the intent of Congress is neither to
vest total control of ANS and ballast water regulations in the federal
government,108 nor for states to again seize sole control of such
measures.109 Rather, a court weighing the constitutional challenge of a
state regulation such as the MBWS must lean toward letting the
regulation stand, particularly when the court can infer that Congress
intended cooperation. As the Sixth Circuit correctly noted in Fednav,
“Congress also found that ‘resolving the problems associated with
aquatic nuisance species will require the participation and cooperation of
the Federal Government and State governments.’”110 Furthermore, the
executive branch, by way of the USCG, indicated in 2004 that “the
congressional mandate is clearly for a Federal-State cooperative regime
in combating the introduction of [ANS] into U.S. waters from ship's [sic]
ballast tanks. This makes it unlikely that preemption, which would
necessitate consultation with the States under Executive Order 13132,
will occur.”111 Titled “Federalism,” Executive Order 13132 mandated
intensive consultation with states prior to imposing regulations that may
trump those of a state.112 Furthermore, the USCG specifically stated that
107. See Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 797
(2008) (reasoning that the issue of “whether state law should be preempted is best
characterized as a subjective ‘political’ decision that is most appropriately made by
Congress, the most politically representative branch.”). In NISA, Congress clearly
indicated that federal and state agencies and political bodies should cooperate in
regulating ANS.
108. As was the case during much of the mid- to late-twentieth century. See Esty,
supra note 11, at 601-02.
109. As was the case prior to the mid-twentieth century. Esty, supra note 11, at 600.
See also Ophelia Eglene, Comment, Transboundary Air Pollution: Regulatory Schemes
& Interstate Cooperation, 7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 129, 133-34 (2002) (proposing
the continuation of successful interstate regulatory control of air pollution under the
Clean Air Act of 1970 after the federal government failed to provide sufficiently strict
guidelines).
110. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 611 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 4701(15) (1996)).
111. Id. at 621 (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. 32864, 32868 (June 14, 2004)) (emphasis in
original).
112. See Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/fedreg /eo/eo13132.htm.

2010]

Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester

395

“each State is authorized under NISA to develop their own regulations if
they feel that Federal regulations are not stringent enough.”113
Nonetheless, Fednav can not be taken as definitive guidance on the issue
of actually treating ballast water under the MBWS, as such direction will
only come when a court hears the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that the
MBWS treatment requirement imposes undue burden on interstate
commerce.
1. Existing Theories for Managing Overlapping Federal and State
Regulatory Schemes
Before spinning Fednav’s guidance into a proposal for better
managing overlapping federal and state regulatory schemes, it is
important to understand—very briefly—existing suggestions for how
best to achieve such an end. Several proposals for managing overlapping
regulatory issues deal more with the allocation of power—such as
granting control to either a state, or the federal government, but seldom
both at the same time.114 Fully addressing this and the myriad other
existing theories is well beyond the scope of this Note.115 It is sufficient
to say that outside of the ANS issue addressed in Fednav, examples of
the federal-state power struggles abound, and that there exist
innumerable proposed solutions for each such struggle.116
A notable exception to the traditional concept of granting power to
either federal or state agencies is a proposal for “modular environmental
regulation,” which seeks to treat each environmental issues as a module
to be addressed by several different agencies at both the state and federal
113. 69 Fed. Reg. 32864, 32865 (June 14, 2004).
114. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE
L. J. 795, 807-08 (2005).
115. For a number of different conceptualizations of managing the overlap of state and
federal regulation, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of
Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555 (2002) (tracing the history of environmental
regulation and a detailed consideration of different concepts for effecting that regulation);
Dennis D Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy and the New
Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001) (detailing the history of traditional state and
federal environmental regulation and proposing a move toward cooperation at all levels);
Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998) (warning that the
modern trend of reinventing traditional concepts of environmental regulation could be
hazardous).
116. Freeman & Farber, supra note 114, at 807-08. Currently, state and federal
regulators are fighting over control of air and water pollution, endangered species
protection, wetlands regulation, and water and energy supply. Id.
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levels.117 This approach assumes that agencies will not only cooperate
effectively once the existing hierarchal structure is loosened, but that
educating both the public and private sectors will make each party both
amicable to such power sharing, and more likely to abide by decisions
when they are made.118 While the Fednav-based proposal that follows
may seem similar to “modular environmental regulation,” a notable
difference is the use of an oversight committee, of sorts, to ensure
cooperation between the many actors involved.
2. Effecting a Better Solution
Taking the next logical step, the question becomes whether there
exists a means by which the tenets of federal-state cooperation identified
by the Sixth Circuit in Fednav can be met. The blueprint for such a
solution already exists in the National Invasive Species Council (NISC).
In 1999, President Clinton established the NISC, which included the
EPA, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security,119
among others.120 Because no overarching law existed to control ANS, let
alone ballast water regulations, the NISC was tasked with ensuring that
each member agency followed its own guidelines for preventing the
spread of ANS.121 In order to meet the NISC’s broad goal of preventing
the spread of ANS, members were required to consult and cooperate with
the states and with pertinent industry actors as the NISC compiled its
biennial National Invasive Species Management Plan (NISMP).122
Establishing the NISC marked the first attempt to bring ANS controls
under one broad framework of intertwined federal and state regulations.
An oversight body similar to the NISC could help harmonize ballast
water regulations that have yet to be enacted by the EPA under the CWA
with those already in place under NISA, the MBWS, and other similar
state statutes.
To this end, and in the spirit of cooperation recognized in Fednav,
Congress could repurpose and expand the Aquatic Nuisance Species
Task Force (Task Force). Originally established under NISA, the Task
117. Id. at 876-77.
118. Id. at 877-89.
119. The Coast Guard was part of the Department of Transportation until February 25,
2003, when it was moved to the Department of Homeland Security. Fednav, 505 F.
Supp. 2d at 386 n.5.
120. Boothe, supra note 4, at 417 n.82 (citing Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg.
6183 (Feb. 3, 1999)).
121. Boothe, supra note 4, at 417.
122. Id.
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Force was created to develop the USCG’s ballast water treatment
program in the Great Lakes region, and ensure that both state and federal
goals were met.123 The Task Force represented an attempt to bring all
interested parties to the table,124 and was directed to seek input from both
state and local lawmakers.125 Specifically,
[w]henever the Task Force determines that there is a substantial
risk of unintentional introduction of an aquatic nuisance species
by an identified pathway and that the adverse consequences of
such an introduction are likely to be substantial, the Task Force
shall, acting through the appropriate Federal agency, and after an
opportunity for public comment, carry out cooperative,
environmentally sound efforts with regional, State and local
entities to minimize the risk of such an introduction.126
The Task Force could easily be expanded to oversee implementation
and harmonization of all federal and state regulations, both present and
pending, including any CWA-based regulations that will inevitably result
from the Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) in
Northwest Environmental Advocates.
For example, both the Senate and House are considering bills—the
Great Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act of 2009127 and Great
Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act128 respectively—either of which
could be altered to specifically account for such an expansion of the Task
Force. Both propose continuation of the NISC,129 and could provide
123. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 386. See also 16 U.S.C. § 4721 (1996) (establishing
the task force).
124. Id. at 386 n.6 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4721(f) (requiring “[e]ach task force member” to
coordinate ANS prevention planning with “other members of the Task Force, and
regional, State and local entities.” (emphasis added)).
125. Fednav, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94.
126. 16 U.S.C. §4722(c)(2) (1996).
127. S. 237, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (referred to the Committee on Environment
and Public Works).
128. H.R. 500, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (referred to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committees on Natural
Resources, Science and Technology, and House Administration.)
129. S. 237, 111th Cong. §183 (2009) (proposing the NISC have oversight, by way of
membership, of Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of
Commerce, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense,
Department of Transportation, Department of Health and Human Services, with
executive council membership for the each such Secretary); H.R. 500, 111th Cong. §163
(2009) (proposing the same oversight as the Senate bill, but including the Environmental
Protection Agency and U.S. Agency for International Development on the council, and
within NISC oversight). The House Bill seems most likely to bring into the fold
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funding necessary not only to sustain the Task Force, but also give it
teeth, so to speak.130 Combining this inter-agency, interstate Task Force
with a meaningful penalty structure for violators131 would achieve not
only the dual aims of safeguarding environmental and economic interests
tied to a states environment, but could help offset the costs of
maintaining enforcement. Presently, the House Bill remains tabled with
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Committees
on Natural Resources, Science and Technology, and House
Administration, while the Senate Bill remains tabled for consideration by
the Committee on Environment and Public Works.132 While such a
lengthy delay—coupled with the myriad other issues currently faced by
Congress—likely mean both bills may well remain on the back burner
for months to come, the bills nonetheless exhibit a willingness by at least
a few members of both legislative bodies to push the issue forward.
Future proposals would do well to take into consideration not only
funding plans and cooperative schemes proposed by the current
legislation, but also the congressional intent extrapolated by the court in
Fednav.
V. CONCLUSION
Like the environmental impetus behind the CWA, NANPCA, NISA,
and MBWS, any future action will be driven by the clear need to prevent
further spread of ANS via poor ballast water management systems.
There is too much at stake for all parties involved, whether federal- or
state-based. Ballast-born ANS continue to wreak havoc on the
environment and economy alike. Current estimates put the yearly

decisions by the EPA under the CWA, as a result of Nw. Envtl. Assoc. Furthermore, the
House version of the bill proposes the creation of an Invasive Species Advisory
Committee, which would specifically “recommend to the Council plans and actions at
local, tribal, State, regional, and ecosystem-based levels to achieve the goals” of the
NISC. Id. at § 166(a)-(c) (2009).
130. S. 237, 111th Cong. §§189, 201 (2009) (proposing initial expenditures of between
$2 and $75 million, with the NISC to produce a budget by 2010); H.R. 500, 111th Cong.
§§ 167, 201 (2009) (proposing initial technical expenditures of up to $75 million on
implementing coastal programs, with the NISC to produce a more detailed budget for
2010).
131. But not fees for permitting, as it would not be in the States’ interest to increase the
likelihood that such permitting fees, as exist under the MBWS, could become more than
de minimis.
132. H.R. 500, 111th Cong. preamble (2009); S. 237, 111th Cong. preamble (2009).
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economic damage to the Great Lakes alone at $500 million.133 Beyond
the zebra mussel, cholera-causing bacteria—which killed 10,000 people
in one Peruvian outbreak134—are easily transported by ballast water.
Similar bacteria cause red tide blooms responsible for up to 100,000
cases of poisoning annually, atop costing the New England shellfish
industries an estimated $3 million a week during prolonged blooms.135
Ultimately, no definitive solution to ballast-born ANS exists.
Nonetheless, Fednav must be construed as clear judicial guidance that
federal and state lawmakers must cooperatively regulate the growing
ANS threat by implementing comprehensive, coterminous ballast water
regulations.

133. Great Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act of 2009, S. 237, 111th Cong.
§2(5)(C) (2009).
134. Christopher J. Patrick, Note, Ballast Water Law: Invasive Species and TwentyFive Years of Ineffective Legislation, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 67, 72 (2009).
135. Id. at 73.

